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Tampere University, University of Bremen
Abstract
We develop first-order logic and some extensions for incomplete infor-
mation scenarios and consider related complexity issues.
1 Introduction
We define (an extension of) first-order logic for scenarios where the underly-
ing model is not fully known. This is achieved by evaluating a formula with
respect to several models simultaneously, not unlike in first-order modal logic.
The set (or even a proper class) of models is taken to represent a collection
of all possible models. The approach uses some ingredients from Hodges’
team semantics.
We shall not formally define what we mean by incomplete information
(or imperfect information for that matter). However, we will not directly
investigate any variant of quantifier independence as in IF-logic (which is
sometimes referred to as first-order logic with imperfect information).
To demonstrate the defined framework from a technical perspective we
also provide a complexity (of satisfiability) result that can be easily extended
to further similar systems not formally studied here.
2 First-order logic with incomplete information
Let τ be a relational signature. Let F (τ) be the smallest set such that the
following conditions hold.
1. For any R ∈ τ , Rx1...xk ∈ F (τ). Here x1, ..., xk are arbitrary variables
(with possible repetitions) from a fixed countably infinite set VAR of
first-order variable symbols. R is a k-ary relation symbol.
2. x = y ∈ F (τ) for all x, y ∈ VAR.
3. If ϕ,ϕ′ ∈ F (τ), then (ϕ ∧ ϕ′) ∈ F (τ).
4. If ϕ ∈ F (τ), then ¬ϕ ∈ F (τ).
5. If x ∈ VAR and ϕ ∈ F (τ), then ∃xϕ ∈ F (τ).
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The above defines the exact syntactic version of first-order logic we shall
consider here.
The semantics of (this version of) first-order logic is here defined with
respect to τ -interpretation classes; a τ -interpretation is a pair (M, f) where
M is a τ -model and f a finite function that maps a finite set of variable
symbols into the domain of M. A τ -interpretation class is a set (or a class)
of τ -interpretations with the functions f having the same domain. From
now on we will only consider τ -interpretation classes that are sets and call
these classes model sets; we acknowledge that a pair (M, f) is more than a
model due to the function f , and indeed such pairs (M, f) are often called
interpretations (while f is an assignment). Having acknowledged this issue,
we shall not dwell on it any more, and we shall even occasionally call pairs
(M, f) models. We note that a model set could also be called a model team
or even an unknown model (in singular indeed).
A choice function for a model setM is a function that maps each model
(M, f) in M to some element a in the domain of M. Recall that h[a/b]
denotes the function h modified or extended so that b maps to a. If F is a
choice function, we let M[F/x] denote the class
{(M, f [F (M, f)/x]) | (M, f) ∈ M}.
We let M[⊤/x] denote the class
{(M, f [b/x]) | (M, f) ∈M and b ∈ Dom(M)}.
The common domain of a model set M is the (possibly empty) intersection
of the domains of the models in M. If A is any subset (including the empty
set) of the common domain of M, we let M[A/x] denote the class
{(M, f [b/x]) | (M, f) ∈ M and b ∈ A}.
Recall that a constant function is a function that maps each input to the
same element. Thus a constant choice function for a model setM is a choice
function that maps each model to the same element in the intersection of
the domains of the models in M). (The empty function is not a constant
choice function for any other than the empty model set.) Let M be a τ -
interpretation class, i.e., a model set. The semantics of first-order logic (with
incomplete information) is defined as follows.
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M |=+ Rx1...xk iff (f(x1), ..., f(xk)) ∈ R
M for all (M, f) ∈ M
M |=+ (ϕ ∧ ψ) iff M |=+ ϕ and M |=+ ψ
M |=+ ¬ϕ iff M |=− ϕ
M |=+ ∃xϕ iff M[F/x] |=+ ϕ for some choice
function for M
M |=− Rx1...xk iff (f(x1), ..., f(xk)) 6∈ R
M for all (M, f) ∈ M
M |=− (ϕ ∧ ψ) iff M′ |=− ϕ and M′′ |=− ψ for some
M′,M′′ s.t. M′ ∪M′′ =M.
M |=− ¬ϕ iff M |=+ ϕ
M |=− ∃xϕ iff M[⊤/x] |=− ϕ
Technically this logic (first-order logic with incomplete information) adds
very little to standard first-order logic: the semantics has simply been lifted
to the level of sets of models (or sets of pairs (M, f)), as the following Propo-
sition shows. However, conceptually the difference with standard first-order
logic approach is clear, and further meaningful divergence can be expected
to arise in the study of extensions of this base formalism.
The following proposition is easy to prove.
Proposition 2.1. Let ϕ be an FO-formula. Then we have
• M |=+ ϕ iff (M, f) |=FO ϕ for all (M, f) ∈ M,
• M |=− ϕ iff (M, f) 6|=FO ϕ for all (M, f) ∈ M.
Corollary 2.2. Let ϕ be an FO-formula. Then
• {(M, f)} |=+ ϕ iff (M, f) |=FO ϕ,
• {(M, f)} |=− ϕ iff (M, f) 6|=FO ϕ.
We then extend the above defined syntax for first-order logic by a formula
construction rule ϕ 7→ Cxϕ. We call the resulting language L∗C . We let LC
be the fragment of L∗C where Cx is not allowed in the scope of negation
operators.
We extend the semantics based on model sets as follows, where by a
constant choice function we mean a choice function that sends all inputs to
the same (existing) element.
M |=+ Cxϕ iff M[F/x] |=+ ϕ for some constant
choice function F for M
The reading of the operator Cx could be something in the lines of there
existing a common x, or perhaps a shared or constant x, or even known or
constructible x. The above suffices for LC . To define a (possible) semantics
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for L∗C , we give the following clause, where M denotes the common domain
of M.
M |=− Cxϕ iff M[M/x] |=− ϕ
We shall discuss L∗C somewhat little as it is somewhat harder to interpret
intuitively than LC .
Let us say that two formulae ϕ,ϕ′ ∈ L∗C are existential variants if ϕ can
be obtained from ϕ′ by replacing some (possibly none) of the quantifiers ∃x
by Cx and some (possibly none) of the quantifiers Cx by ∃x. The following
is easy to prove (cf. Corollary 2.2).
Proposition 2.3. Let ϕ be an FO-formula and assume ϕ′ ∈ L∗C is an exis-
tential variant of ϕ. Then
• {(M, f)} |=+ ϕ′ iff (M, f) |=FO ϕ,
• {(M, f)} |=− ϕ′ iff (M, f) 6|=FO ϕ.
It would be interesting and relatively easy to extend in a natural way the
first-order part1 of the above framework to involve generalized quantifiers
(following [13]). Another option would be to consider operators that give a
Turing-complete formalism (following [12] or even [15]2), possibly following a
direct game-theoretic approach rather than the team semantics flavoured one
1The part without operators Cx.
2One of the main reasons for defining the Turing complete logic L in [12] is to enable
the study of standard logic problems in that framework. Indeed, studying complexities
of finite satisfiability and finite validity problems makes a lot of sense in the framework
of L, while first-order logic FO is not the right framework for related studies; studying
fragments of L makes more sense than studying only fragments of FO. First-order logic
is too weak to capture standard computational logics with recursion mechanisms, while L
contains such logics as direct fragments almost. Also, doing descriptive complexity in the
framework of L makes sense, as L captures RE and thus all standard complexity classes
correspond to fragments of the umbrella logic L. Using an umbrella logic enables one to
directly identify how logical constructors lead to increases in expressivity. Also LRE of
[15] can be used as a basis for different kinds of studies in a similar way as L and due to
analogous reasons.
Capturing complexity classes with L and LRE is quite easy. One can for example modify
the semantics of L by putting limits to the number of times a loop can be entered. For
example, one can dictate that each loop can be used only a polynomial (in the model
domain size) number of times, or exponential, or whatever. This is involves using clocked
loops in the same way as in [7], but with more adjusted limits. One can also limit
the amount by how many points domains can be expanded in both logics L and LRE.
Capturing, e.g., ExpSpace and PSpace is rather easy. And even many of the higher
classes are also easy to capture nicely due to the domain expansion capacity.
Lack of recursion is not the only weakness of FO. It is quite striking (and says something
about the state of logic as a field) that none of the paradigmantic computational logics
has, e.g., majority quantifiers ‘for most x’ in them. This is striking because similarity
relations are central for real-life reasoning, and most similarity relations are defined in
terms of majority statements and the like. (Probabilistic logics are of course relatively
widely studied, however, so things are not all that bad.) The logic L can simulate typical
majority statements and whatnot, so L banishes most related problems. The expressivity
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given above. This would lead to formalisms for parallelism and distributed
computation when used with model sets as opposed to models. However,
while these generalizations can be done such that the resulting formalisms
are easily seen natural, the formalism here that uses Cx is harder to inter-
pret especially if we allow for Cx in the scope of negations. If we use the
semantics in formulae with Cx occurrences, then disjunction together with
Cx can become peculiar.3 Indeed, consided the model set M with two dis-
joint models and nothing else. Now M satisfies4 Cx(x = x) ∨ C(x = x)
while not satisfying Cx(x = x). Thus the reading of ∨ indeed is should be
“there are two cases such that ϕ and ψ" or even “the possibilities split into
two cases such that in the first case ϕ and in the second case ψ." (Note that
dependence logic requires a similar reading of ∨ to be natural.) Obviously,
implications (e.g., P (x) → ϕ which stands for ¬P (x) ∨ ϕ) can of course be
read “if P (x), then ϕ" but also “in the case P (x), we have ϕ."
These are natural readings especially if one is attempting to unify se-
mantics and proofs, thereby relating ∨ with the proof by cases protocol.
Adopting the perspective that a model set is (intuitively) a single fixed but
unknown object (for example any group from a collection of groups that ex-
tend a particular single group5) is very natural and in such a framework it
is natural to make statements about splitting into cases. ("The (unknown)
group G has property P or G has property Q...")6 This is true especially
because proofs are often (or almost always) made for a fixed but unknown
object or objects. Thus the above semantics works for formalising that kind
of thinking. Category theory of course can also be thought to operate this
way but here we have a very simple logic that can also directly speak about
the internal structure of objects. It is obviously easy to expand the above
framework, but we shall leave that for later.
of L is, indeed, of a fundamental nature. The same holds not for FO, despite Lindström’s
theorems. Of course L is fundamental mainly in relation to finite models, but still.
Classifying fragments of FO is, nevertheless, interesting and reasonably relevant. A
proper classification scheme for fragments can be easily based on an algebraic approach.
Indeed, cylindric algebras and Codd’s theorem offer obvious clues how we get access to
fragments in a proper way. While prefix classes of FO offer a nice starting point for
classifications, it is a too crude approach. Even the Guarded Fragment and FO2 fall
outside prefix classes, not to mention logics with more intricate limitations, such as limited
uses of ¬ and whatnot. A lot remains to be said about this issue, but this is getting too
irrelevant to the main text. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is nice, but similarly, probably some
eighty percent of the text is irrelevant to the main argument there.
3Note that ϕ ∨ ψ simply means ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) here.
4See [5] for similar considerations.
5Groups have a relational representation here since we are considering relational sig-
natures.
6Similar statements are omnipresent. Further operators arise for related statements,
such as "It is possible thatG has property P ," etcetera. This modality statement obviously
seems to say (more or less) that the subset (of the current model set) where G has P is
nonempty.
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3 Satisfiability and applications
We say that a sentence ϕ ∈ LC is satisfiable if there is some nonempty
model setM |=+ ϕ. The satisfiability problem for a fragment F of LC takes
a sentence of F as an input and asks whether some nonempty model set
satisfies ϕ, i.e., whether M |=+ ϕ for some nonemtpy model set M.
The two-variable fragment of LC is the set of formulae that use instances
of only the two variables x and y. We next show a complexity result con-
cerning the two-variable fragment of LC , although it is easy to see that the
related argument rather flexibly generalizes to suitable other fragments as
well. We discuss two-variable logic for convenience and also as it and its vari-
ants (even in the team semantics context) have received a lot of attention in
recent years, see, e.g., [1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 13, 17].
Proposition 3.1. The satisfiability problem of the two-variable fragment of
LC is NEXPTIME-complete.
Proof. Define the following translation T from LC into FO, where D is a
fresh unary relation symbol (intuitively representing the common domain of
a model set).
T (Rx1...xk) = Rx1...xk
T (x = y) = x = y
T (¬ϕ) = ¬T (ϕ)
T ((ϕ ∧ ψ)) = (T (ϕ) ∧ T (ψ))
T (∃xϕ) = ∃xT (ϕ)
T (Cxϕ) = ∃x(Dx ∧ T (ϕ))
We will prove below (in a couple of steps) that a formula ϕ of LC is satisfied
by some nonempty model set iff T (ϕ) is satisfied by some model (in the
classical sense). This will conclude the proof of the current proposition as it
is well known that the satisfiability problem of two-variable first order logic
is NEXPTIME-complete.
We first note that if T (ϕ) is satisfiable by some model (M, f), then we
have {(M, f)} |=+ T (ϕ) by Corollary 2.2. From here it is very easy to show
that ϕ is satisfiable by the same model set by evaluating formulae step by
step from outside in (and recalling the syntactic restrictions of LC .) Thus it
now suffices to show that if some nonempty model set satisfies ϕ, then T (ϕ)
is satisfied by some model. To prove this, we begin by making the following
auxiliary definition.
Let M be a model set and let MD denote the model set obtained from
M by adding a unary predicate D to each model that covers exactly the
common domain of M. Recall that we have already fixed ϕ.
Claim. M |=+ ϕ implies MD |=
+ T (ϕ).
The claim is easy to prove by evaluating formulae from outside in using the
semantics for model sets.
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Assume that M |=+ ϕ for some nonempty model set M. Thus MD |=
+
T (ϕ) by the claim. Thus (M, f) |=FO T (ϕ) for all (M, f) ∈ MD by Propo-
sition 2.1. Therefore (since MD is nonempty) we have (M, f) |=FO T (ϕ) for
some (M, f) ∈ MD. This concludes the very easy proof.
Going from perfect to imperfect information is in general extremely easy
to justify in several ways, so let us look at more concrete and even rather
specific and particular possible applications of model sets.
Ontology-based data access and related querying frameworks obviously
offer a natural application for model sets. The work there is rather active,
see, e.g., [2, 4] and the references therein. Another obvious and quite dif-
ferent application is distributed computing. One (of many) ways to model
a computer network via logic would be to combine the approaches of [10]
(which accounts for communication) with [12] (which accounts for the local
(Turing-complete) computation). The nodes of [10] would become first-order
models, so the domains considered would be model sets (with relations that
connect models to other models). See also [11] for some (simple) adaptations
of the framework in [10].
For yet another example, let ϕ and ψ denote your favourite theorems.
One can now ask: “Does ψ follow from ϕ?” The first answer could be:
“Yes, since ϕ is a true theorem, it in fact already follows from an empty
set of assumptions.” The next answer could be a bit more interesting: for
example, if ϕ and ψ were theorems of arithmetic, one could try to investigate
if ψ follows from ϕ as a logical consequence, i.e., even without the axioms of
arithmetic. Different approaches to relevance have been widely studied, and
the example below is not unrelated to that.
Let D be a deduction system (or some conceptually similar algorithm).
Now, for each n ∈ N, let→Dn denote the connective defined such that ϕ→
D
n ψ
holds if ψ can be deduced from the premiss ϕ in n deduction steps (appli-
cations of deduction rules) in D. Here ‘ϕ →Dn ψ holds’ is a metalogical
statement; we could consider closing the underlying logic under→Dn and the
other connectives, but we shall not do that now. We note that also state-
ments (ϕ1, ..., ϕk)→
D
n ψ, containing several premises, can be introduced.
Statements ϕ →Dn ψ capture aspects of relevance. The idea here is that
whether ψ follows from ϕ, depends on the particular background knowledge
and abilities as well as the computational capacity (of an agent, for example).
With this interpretation, it is indeed highly contingent whether something
follows in n steps from something else. It here depends on the particularities
of D. Also, how immediately something follows from something else, is a
matter of degree. This is the role of the subindex n.
This kind of a framework is one example (of many) that can be elaborated
in a possibly more interesting way by using an approach to proofs that is
directly (indeed, directly) linked to semantics, with connectives correspond-
ing to proof steps. Model sets offer such possibilities in a natural way. It
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is worth noting that also refutation calculi (rather than proof calculi), and
generalizations thereof, fit into the framework well. The related approaches
can be based on the dual systems of [13]. That framework obviously offers
quite natural possibilities for generalizations of model sets as well.
Another natural and related approach is to consider extensions of ATL7
with individual states replaced by relational structures. The players then
modify the relational structure in every step, leading essentially to a com-
putation tree with nodes corresponding to relational structures.8 This is a
very general approach. In the particular case of modeling proofs or evolving
information states, the relational structures can simply be (or encode) sets
of formulae for example. Note that even paraconsistent states are quite easy
to handle here, as they are simply inconsistent sets of formulae. More on
this in section 3.2 below.
It is especially interesting to consider systems where the individual play-
ers take actions, and those actions plus the action of nature then computably
(or in a semi-decidable way) produce the new relational model. The moves
are determined by the previous relational structure and the actions. Even
distributed computing systems and beyond are natural in the framework.
Note that even infinite structures make immediate sense here if there exists
a perception function that returns a finite structure from each infinite struc-
ture, and that finite structure is then used by at least the agents’ strategies.
Note that different agents’ strategies can even depend on different (but prob-
ably overlapping) relation symbol sets. In any case, it is natural to make the
strategies to depend solely on the current relational structure; any memory
ought to be encoded in that structure (and can be visible to only a single
agent since the agents can see different relation symbol sets). This is a nice
way to model the interaction of minds together with the material world.
Multiperspective thought provides another example of immediate appli-
cations of model sets. Such thought seems to be considered controversial by
many. Yet, it is mostly very simple, and it is indeed surprizing that it is so
often considered problematic. The difficulties in understanding related state-
ments are often due to the assumption of bivalence and the assumption that
concepts have fully fixed meanings in contexts where such assumptions are
naïve.9 Let us consider a very simple formal framework that captures—and
7ATL stands for alternating time temporal logic.
8It can be quite natural to let strategies be determined by the relational structure only,
which means that positional strategies are used. Trivially, incomplete information can be
modeled—with some success—with model sets (instead of individual structures) as states.
(Of course these can simply be considered sets of states, if desired.)
9Indeed, many—if not most—philosophical problems stem from underdeterminacy of
concepts. Here ‘underdetermined’ could mean ‘not fully defined’ and determined ‘fully
defined.’ Alternatively, ‘underdetermined’ could here stand for ‘not specified up to a
sufficient extent’ and determined for ‘specified up to a sufficient extent.’ Philosophical
confusion quite typically arises from considering underdetermined concepts determined.
A related and highly relevant demarcation problem is to try to determine which questions
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thus elucidates—at least some aspects of multiperspective thought.
Consider a model set U which we shall call the universe. A property is
a subset P ⊆ U . (Properties need not be closed under isomorphism.) A
weight function is a mapping w : Pow(U) → S, where S is some non-empty
set and Pow the power set operator; the set S could be, for example, the
set of real numbers R. We call the set S the set of weights and the elements
s ∈ S are obviously called weights. Let Sm denote the set of multisets over
S, i.e., collections of elements of S that also enable different multiplicities of
elements to occur.10 A function E : Sm → V is called an evaluation function,
where the set V is an arbitrary set of values v ∈ V . For example, for finite
U and with S = R, the function E could be the operator that gives the sum
of any collection of inputs.
Now, let s be a one-to-one function from Pow(U) into a set of state-
ments, so each property P is associated with a statement s(P). The weight
of the statement s(P) is w(P) and the value of a set K of statements is
E({w(P) | s(P) ∈ K}), where the argument set is a multiset of weights of
statements.
So, we (or a group of people) can know that different properties hold, i.e.,
we know the actual model is inside different sets P ⊆ U . Each property P
contributes a weight. We can possibly combine the weights and get different
values, depending on which properties are involved. For example, some
true properties can contribute a negative number (as a weight) and others a
positive one. The full value is the value obtained by considering the multiset
of weights of all properties. (For example, the full value could be the sum
of all weights.) Now, the full value then, in the end, can be associated with
a truth value, if desired. Note that it often natural to take the intersection
of all known properties first and then associate that one property with a
weight.
For example, I can state that John is rich as he has a million dollars on
his bank account, and Jill can state that John is not rich as he has a debt of
two million dollars. Obviously these observations of partial knowledge (i.e.,
John has money and debt) are simply contributions towards an ultimate
picture, and the possible seeming syntactic contrariness of the related partial
statements (John is rich and John is not rich) amounts to nothing much at
can be naturally turned into ‘determined’ questions and which not. Here a prima facie
idea would be that in favourable cases, a question turns into a set of determined ques-
tions, one for each natural interpretation, with each determined question being associated
with definitions that force determinacy. The issue is then to consider how natural and
appropriate those differing sets of definitions are (and also to solve the—unambiguous but
open—determined questions). In less favourable cases, the question simply escapes all
attempts to banish ambiguities, due to intrinsic ambiguities and finite resources for the
classification process. A sometimes sufficient ‘metasolution’ here could perhaps be that
no solution can be obtained.
10We allow for infinite multipilicities, but limit the largest possible multiplicity with
some sufficiently large cardinal, for example something greater than the power set of U .
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all.
The next section shortly discusses a fresh link between logic and com-
binatorics. The connection to model sets is kind of trivial but nice. Every
combinatorial property P and input structure domain size n will give rise
to a model set Pn which contains the models with property P and the do-
main size n. The domain of the models can naturally be considered to be
{0, . . . , n−1}. The size of Pn is related to the counting enumeration function
for Pn.
3.1 The interplay of logic and combinatorics
What is enumerative combinatorics? This is, of course, a philosophical ques-
tion. The business of enumerative combinatorics often follows the following
pattern:
1. Input: a property.
2. Output: the enumeration function for the property.
Perhaps a more accurate picture would be the following.
1. Input: a property.
2. Output: a formula for the enumeration function for the property.
For example, we could be asked how many symmetric binary relations
there are on an n-element set. There are 2(
n
2)+n symmetric binary relations
on an n-element set, so here the input would be the property of being a
symmetric binary relation, and the output would be the formula 2(
n
2)+n.
Another example could be the following.
1. Input: being an anti-involutive11 function f : n→ n.
2. Output: a formula for the enumeration function for the property.
The enumeration function is given by
i=⌊n/2⌋∑
i=0
(−1)i(n− 1)n−2i
(
n
2i
)
(2i)!
2i · i!
which follows, for example, as a special case of Proposition 3.1 of [16].
Now, an interesting and relevant idea would be to formalize both the in-
put and output in our general scheme for enumerative combinatorics. There
is a lot of freedom in the way this can be done. For example, the input prop-
erties could be formalized in first-order logic or even (fragments of) some
11Here we define a function to be anti-involutive if f(f(x)) 6= x for all inputs x.
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stronger logic such as the Turing-complete logic from [12].12 On the output
side, also many different formalisms could be interesting. Arithmetic formu-
lae could be constructed from +, ·,
∑
,
∏
etcetera, starting from a variable
n (or even several variables). Different kinds of results would be obtained
for different sets of functions and operators. Subtraction, division, exponen-
tiation, factorials, and operators for all kinds of basic operations13 could be
used in various different combinations. Our above example would become
formulated as follows.
1. Input: ∀x∀y¬(Rxy ∧Ryx) ∧ ∀x∃=1y Rxy.
2. Output:
i=⌊n/2⌋∑
i=0
(−1)i(n− 1)n−2i
(n
2i
) (2i)!
2i · i!
.
There exists no theory based on this exact idea, so it must be built. There
is indeed a lot of freedom here. The idea of the suggested research programme
is to understand the interplay of logical operators and arithmetic functions
(and operators). How do arithmetic expressions arise from the logic-based
specifications combinatorial properties, and vice versa? What can we learn
from those connections?
However, something is known of course. For example, already [16] gives
the answer to the above input ∀x∀y¬(Rxy ∧Ryx) ∧ ∀x∃=1y Rxy in an al-
gorithmic way. Indeed, from [16], an algorithm can be extracted that takes
as inputs formulae of two-variable logic with a functionality axiom and out-
puts formulae for the related enumeration functions. If we care only about
the complexity of the enumeration function instead of arithmetic formulae
describing it, then of course results in model counting are immediately inter-
esting as well. For example, all properties expressible in two-variable logic
have PTIME-computable enumeration functions even when a functionality
axiom is used [16].14
3.2 Some general notions of a system
In this section we define some general notions of an evolving system. No
restrictions based on computability will be imposed at first. We begin with
formal definitions and give concrete examples after that.
Let σ denote a (possibly infinite) vocabulary. Let A be an arbitrary set
and I an ordered set. Intuitively, A is a set of actions and I a set of indices
or agent names.
12Also the Turing-complete logic LRE from [15] would be interesting here.
13In addition to
∑
,
∏
, a whole range of operations comes to mind, even ones for con-
structing recurrence relations etcetera. The sky is the limit.
14The input here is given in unary, conceptually being associated with a structure do-
main rather than simply domain size.
11
Definition 3.2. A system frame base (or simply a base) over (σ,A, I) is a
structure (S, F ) defined as follows.
1. S is a set of σ-models. The set S and any of the models can be
infinite.15
2. F is a function F : S ×AI → P(S). We require that F returns a
non-empty set. (This is neither crucial nor elegant but is here done to
simplify things. An empty output can be modelled by special features
on output models.)
A system frame over (σ,A, I) is structure (S, F,G) defined as follows.
1. (S, F ) is a system frame base as defined above.
2. Let T be the set of sequences
(
(Mi,ai)
)
0≤i≤k
such that the following
conditions hold.
(a) k ∈ N.
(b) Mi ∈ S and ai ∈ A
I for each i.
(c) Mi+1 ∈ F (Mi,ai) for all i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}.
The set T is called the set of finite proper evolutions of (S, F ). We
define G to be a function G : T → S such that G(t) ∈ F (Mk,ak)
for all t ∈ T , where (Mk,ak) is the last member of the sequence t ∈ T .
A system over (σ,A, I) is a structure (S, F,G, (fi)i∈I) defined as follows.
1. (S, F,G) is a system frame as defined above.
2. Each fi is a function fi : S → A.
The set S is the domain of (S, F ), (S, F,G) and (S, F,G, (fi)i∈I).
We often talk about frame bases (or bases) and frames instead of system
frame bases and system frames.
Intuitively, the frame base of a system can be considered the material or
physical part of the system, while G and the functions fi are the non-physical
or non-material part. The functions fi can be associated with individual
agents16, while G can be considered a higher force that ultimately determines
the final evolutive behaviour of the system.17 The agents choose actions from
15If desired, the set S can even be a set of pairs (M, f), where M is a σ-model and f
an assignment mapping variables to the domain of M.
16More accurately, the functions fi are agent behaviour strategies and indices in I
correspond to agents or agent place holders.
17G can be interpreted in many ways. It could simply be considered change or luck, to
give one example. One of the main features of G is that it removes non-determinism from
systems.
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A based on the current model, and a new model is then produced according
to the function G based on the chosen actions.
Let M = (S, F,G, (fi)i∈I) be a system over (σ,A, I) with domain S. A
pair (M,M), where M ∈ S, is called an instance. We may also call (M,M)
a pointed system, in analogy with modal logic. The set of finite evolutions of
the frame base (S, F ) is the set that containins all finite proper evolutions
of (S, F ) and all models M ∈ S. The models can be thought of as zero-step
evolutions of (S, F ). The set of finite evolutions of the system M is the
set that contains all M ∈ S and all pairs (t,Mk+1) such that the following
conditions hold.
1. t = (Mi,ai)i≤k for some k ≥ 0, all models and action tuples being
from M .
2. ai = (fi(Mi))i∈I for each i ≤ k.
3. Mi+1 = G
(
(Mj ,aj)j≤i
)
for all i ≤ k.
An infinite evolution is defined similarly, in the obvious way, but without
the final model Mk+1. Note that the agents’ choices are determined by the
current model rather than the sequence including also all the previous models
and actions leading to the current model. The interpretation of this is that
histories are to be encoded in the current model, i.e., the current material
world. It is also natural to consider memory, somehow encoded, rather than
some full history.
While this framework is an intuitive way of thinking about systems, there
are other natural choices. We shall look at an alternative way of defining
systems such that the non-physical part can (ultimately) be eliminated, more
or less, from the picture. This new way is, for most purposes, essentially
equivalent to the old definition above.
Consider a system frame S := (S, F,G). We describe a way to eliminate
the function G. For each E = M0,a0, . . . ,Mk+1 that is a finite evolution
of the frame base (S, F ), we create a new model ME which has Mk+1 as a
basic part and some encoding of the evolution sequence E as a disjoint part,
with elements labelled by some fresh predicate in order to be able to tell
which part of the new model encodes E; also other fresh relation symbols
can of course be used, for example to encode the order in which the models
occur, and the actions that lead from one model to another, etcetera. We
then create a new domain S ′ that includes S and all the new models, that is,
the new domain includes (encodings of) all finite evolution sequences E of
(S, F ). The zero-step evolutions can be thought of as starting point models
in the new system frame base we are about to create. We define a new index
set I ′ by adding a new index J to the beginning of I in order to be able to
accommodate a new function gJ that simulates functions G.
18 We modify
18Formally, I ′ is an ordered set that begins with J after which come the elements of I .
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F to a new function F ′ : I ′ → A′, where A′ extends A, in the way described
next.
We first define a new function F ′G that informally speaking always out-
puts the set of models (now extended with the history) that the function G
would also have given. More formally, let M be a model in the new domain,
and let a ∈ AI . Let E = ((Mi,ai)i≤k,N) denote the evolution (containing
models from the old domain) that is encoded in the structure of M. Thus N
is the model in the old domain that M corresponds to, i.e., N is the current
model that M encodes. We define F ′G(M,a) to be the model whose current
part is M′ = G(E · (N,a)) and which encodes the evolution E ·a ·M′. Notice
that F ′G is now deterministic. The frame base (S
′, F ′G) simulates (S, F,G)
in the obvious way.
Note that F ′G covers only one particular function G. We can modify the
framework by defining a deterministic function F ′ which takes into account
different possible functions G. Indeed, we can define F ′ so that the novel
index J can accommodate different functions19 gJ that simulate functions G.
We include in A′ ⊇ A a single choice for each possible behaviour pattern that
give an outcome model based on the moves of the old agents fi with i ∈ I.
Then the function F ′ can easily be modified to deterministically provide the
outcome that G would force. We can make A′ small is all features in our
framework are suitably regular.
It is possible to require that the functions G and fi (and even F ) of
different systems are somehow part of (or encoded in) the models. This is
easy to accomplish by suitable encodings. For example, we can easily encode
Turing machines into the models in system domains. It is possible even to
modify these machines on the fly and dictate that if no output is given, or
if there is even a syntax error in the encoding, then some default action is
taken. These kinds of systems can be called fully material. The requirement
is that F , G and each fi behave as their material counterparts (encoded
in the models) would dictate. Now systems become essentially equivalent
to system domains, but of course fixed background definitions are needed
if we somehow try to specify systems only by giving the domains (in one
way or another), as otherwise we cannot necessarily determine the intended
evolutionary behaviour of the systems.
While the functions fi can depend on all of the current model, which is
natural when modelling perfect information games, it is also natural to define
perception functions and make functions fi depend upon perceived models.
We can let an individual perception function be a map ϕ : S → S ′, where
S ′ contains models whose signature may be different from those in S. Now,
even if the input model to ϕ is infinite, the output model can be finite and
depend only on some small part of the input model. We can now dictate
that fi(x) = f(ϕ(x)) for each input x, where f gives an action in A. For
19Note that these functions are simply strategies of an agent.
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a concrete example, ϕ could be a first-order reduction, more or less in the
sense of descriptive complexity, that gives a very crude, finite approximation
of the original model. Note that agents’ epistemic states can be somehow
part of the original models, so agents can take these into account up to one
extent or another.
It is also natural and easy to tie the functions f to material bodies. These
can be modelled by, e.g., specially reserved predicate symbols or some more
general constructions. The perception functions can be relativised to depend
on only the substructures that the bodies of agents (almost) cover. Note
that there is no problem in letting the bodies of different agents overlap. It
is natural (but by no means necessary) to let the encodings of the machines
that govern functions fi to be part of the bodies of the related agents.
While cellular automata are an ok starting point for digital physics, the
above described approach (and its numerous trivial variants) offer a much
richer modelling framework for related formal approaches to physics.20 The
metaphysical setting of such formal frameworks offers a lot of explanatory
power for the deeper level nature of physical (and other) phenomena. The
interplay of the supposedly mental constructs (G and each fi) with the ma-
terial parts is obviously highly interesting. The fully formal nature of the
systems will simply force new concepts and insights to emerge as the result
of concrete modelling attempts. Importantly, it is not at all necessary to
always keep everything computable or recursively enumerable, even though
such limitations are an obviously interesting and important case. Nor is
there any reason to force entities (agents) to be somehow local in models.
As suggested in [14], extensions of the Turing-complete logic can be nat-
urally used as logics to guide such systems (when using semi-computable
functions).
3.3 Hierarchical approaches
Here we look at ways of dealing with modalities. There are various prima
facie reasonable ways to proceed. Let us begin with one.
Let M be a set of pointed Kripke models. (By fixing some variable, say
x, sets of Kripke models can be associated with model sets: a pointed model
(M, w) is identified with (M, f) where f(x) = w.)
Let (Pα)α∈Z+ be a sequence such that
1. P1 ⊆M.
2. Pα+1 ⊆ P(Pα).
21
20Of course one of the first ideas is to keep more or less all functions computable or
semi-computable. Partial functions can be suitably accommodated into the system of
course.
21Here P is the power set operator, so P(Sα) is the power set of Sα.
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We call Pα a perspective of rank α. It makes sense to not allow the empty
set to belong to perspectives. We thus do so here.
Consider the language of modal logic,
ϕ ::= P | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | ¬ϕ | ♦ϕ
where P is any unary predicate (i.e., a proposition symbol) in the signature
of the models of M.
Define the rank r(ϕ) of a formula ϕ in the natural way as follows.
1. r(χ) = 0 for each atomic formula χ.
2. r(¬χ) = r(χ).
3. r(χ ∧ ψ) = max{r(χ), r(ψ)}.
4. r(♦ϕ) = r(ϕ) + 1.
A perspective Pα of rank α can interpret formulae of rank α or less with
the following semantics.
Assume first that r(ϕ) < α. Then
Pα |= ϕ iff Pα−1 |= ϕ for all Pα−1 ∈ Pα
Note that if α = 1, then Pα−1 is a pointed model in Pα. Then the above holds
with the natural definition that Pα−1 = (M, w) |= ϕ iff we have (M, w) |=K ϕ
where |=K is the standard semantic turnstile of Kripke semantics.
Assume then that r(¬ψ) = r(χ ∧ ψ) = r(♦ϕ) = α. Then
Pα |= (χ ∧ ψ) iff Pα |= χ and Pα |= ψ
Pα |= ¬ψ iff Pα 6|= ψ
Pα |= ♦ϕ iff Pα−1 |= ϕ for some Pα−1 ∈ Pα
3.3.1 First-order modal logic and beyond
We then consider first-order modal logic and beyond. The approach is very
similar to the one above, but we spell it out anyway, because we can.
Let M be a model set, i.e., a set of pairs (M, f) where f is some assign-
ment for M, interpreting first-order variables. Let (Pα)α∈Z+ be a sequence
such that
1. P1 ⊆M.
2. Pα+1 ⊆ P(Pα), where P is again the power set operator.
We call Pα a perspective of rank α. Again it often makes sense to not allow
the empty set to belong to or be a perspective. Also, it is relatively natural
to require the domain of all the models in the model set M to be the same.
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A perspective Pα is called regular if it is built from a model set where all
models have the same domain. It is strongly regular if we also have Pα′ 6= ∅
for all perspectives Pα′ that are part of Pα on the different rank levels of
Pα (with the perspective Pα itself also nonempty). Below we study strongly
regular perspectives only.
Consider the language of first-order modal logic,
ϕ ::= Rx1 . . . xk | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | ¬ϕ | ∃xϕ | ♦ϕ
where Rx1 . . . xk is any atom.
Define the rank r(ϕ) of a formula ϕ as follows.
1. r(χ) = 0 for each atomic formula χ.
2. r(¬χ) = r(χ).
3. r(χ ∧ ψ) = max{r(χ), r(ψ)}.
4. r(∃xϕ) = r(ϕ).
5. r(♦ϕ) = r(ϕ) + 1.
A perspective Pα of rank α can interpret formulae of depth α or less with
the following semantics.
Assume first that r(ϕ) < α. Then
Pα |= ϕ iff Pα−1 |= ϕ for all Pα−1 ∈ Pα
Note that if α = 1, then Pα−1 is a model (M, f) in Pα. Then the above holds
with the natural additional definition that (M, f) |= ϕ iff (M, f) |=FO ϕ
where |=FO is the standard semantic turnstile of FO.
Assume then that r(¬ψ) = r(χ ∧ ψ) = r(♦ϕ) = α ≥ 1. Then
Pα |= (χ ∧ ψ) iff Pα |= χ and Pα |= ψ
Pα |= ¬ψ iff Pα 6|= ψ
Pα |= ♦ϕ iff Pα−1 |= ϕ for some Pα−1 ∈ Pα
If P is a perspective, we let P [a/x] denote the perspective where each
model (M, f) existing on the rank 0 level of P is replaced by (M, f [a/x]). By
the model domain of P we refer to the domain of the models the (regular)
perpective P is built with. Assume ∃xϕ and P have the same rank. We
define
P |= ∃xϕ iff P [a/x] |= ϕ for some a in the model domain of P .
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3.3.2 Propositional modal logic, a new take
Here we look at further ways of dealing with modalities. Perspectives are as
above for propositional modal logic. (Thus we can flexibly talk about both
pairs (M, f) and pairs (M, w) in the discussions.)
Consider the following language of modal logic:
ϕ ::= P | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | (ϕ ∨ ϕ) | ¬ϕ | ♦ϕ
where P is any unary predicate (i.e., a proposition symbol) in the signature
of the models of M. This time we are not going to consider ∨ to be defined
in terms of ∧ in the usual way.
Define the rank of formulae as before, with r(χ ∨ ψ) being defined the
same as r(χ ∧ ψ). A perspective Pα of rank α can again interpret formulae
of depth α or less with the following semantics.
Assume first that r(ϕ) < α. Then
Pα |=
+ ϕ iff Pα−1 |=
+ ϕ for all Pα−1 ∈ Pα
Pα |=
− ϕ iff Pα−1 |=
− ϕ for all Pα−1 ∈ Pα
Note that if α = 1, then Pα−1 is a pointed model in Pα. Then the above
holds with the natural definition that
(M, w) |=+ ϕ iff (M, w) |= ϕ
(M, w) |=− ϕ iff (M, w) 6|= ϕ
where |= is the basic turnstile of Kripke semantics.
We then make the following auxiliary definition. Assume χ is of some
rank αχ < α. Consider a perspective Pα. We define Pα ↾ χ to be the
perspective (or rank α) that can be obtained from Pα by removing each
perspective Qαχ from the rank αχ level such that Qαχ 6|=
+ χ. More formally,
we define Pα ↾ χ as follows.
Recall that Pα is defined inductively with the condition that
1. P1 ⊆M,
2. Pβ+1 ⊆ P(Pβ).
Define a new sequence (Qβ)1≤β≤α
1. If αχ = 0, then Q1 = { (M, f) ∈ P1 | (M, f) |= χ }. Otherwise Q1 =
P1.
2. Suppose we have defined Qβ.
(a) If αχ > β, then Qβ+1 = Pβ+1.
(b) If αχ = β, then Qβ+1 = {Rβ ∈ Pβ+1 |Rβ |=
+ χ }.
(c) If αχ < β, then Qβ+1 = {Rβ ↾ χ |Rβ ∈ Pβ+1, Rβ ↾ χ 6= ∅ }.
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We define Pα ↾ χ = Qα. We also define Pα ↾ χ to be equal to Pα ↾ ∼ χ
where ∼ denotes classical negation, i.e., if χ is of rank 0, then (M, f) |= ∼ χ
iff (M, f) 6|= χ, and if χ of rank β, then Pβ |=
+∼ χ iff Pβ 6|=
+ χ.
Assume then that r(♦ϕ) = r(ψ) = α and r(χ) < α. Then
Pα |=
+ (χ ∧ ψ) iff Pα |=
+ χ and Pα |=
+ ψ
Pα |=
+ (ψ ∧ χ) iff Pα |=
+ ψ and Pα |=
+ χ
Pα |=
+ (χ ∨ ψ) iff
(
(Pα ↾ χ) |=
+ ψ or (Pα ↾ χ) = ∅
)
Pα |=
+ (ψ ∨ χ) iff
(
(Pα ↾ χ) |=
+ ψ or (Pα ↾ χ) = ∅
)
Pα |=
+ ¬ψ iff Pα |=
− ψ
Pα |=
+ ♦ϕ iff Pα−1 |=
+ ϕ for some Pα−1 ∈ Pα
Pα |=
− (χ ∧ ψ) iff Pα |=
− χ or Pα |=
− ψ
Pα |=
− (ψ ∧ χ) iff Pα |=
− ψ or Pα |=
− χ
Pα |=
− (χ ∨ ψ) iff
(
(Pα ↾ χ) |=
− ψ and (Pα ↾ χ) 6= ∅
)
Pα |=
− (ψ ∨ χ) iff
(
(Pα ↾ χ) |=
− ψ and (Pα ↾ χ) 6= ∅
)
Pα |=
− ¬ψ iff Pα |=
+ ψ
Pα |=
− ♦ϕ iff Pα−1 |=
− ϕ for all Pα−1 ∈ Pα
Assume then that r(χ) = r(ψ) = α. Then
Pα |=
+ (χ ∧ ψ) iff Pα |=
+ χ and Pα |=
+ ψ
Pα |=
− (χ ∧ ψ) iff Pα |=
− χ or Pα |=
− ψ
Pα |=
+ (χ ∨ ψ) iff Pα |=
+ χ or Pα |=
+ ψ
Pα |=
− (χ ∨ ψ) iff Pα |=
− χ and Pα |=
− ψ
Now add an implication → to then language, with r(ϕ→ ψ) = r(ϕ∨ψ).
The semantics of χ→ ψ in relation to Pα is defined as for other connectives
when r(ϕ∨ψ) < α. For the case where r(χ) < α = r(ψ), it is quite natural to
define that Pα |=
+ (χ→ ψ) iff (Pα ↾ χ) |=
+ ψ or (Pα ↾ χ) = ∅. The negative
clause would be Pα |=
− (χ→ ψ) iff (Pα ↾ χ) |=
− ψ and (Pα ↾ χ) 6= ∅. For
the case r(χ) = α, we put Pα |=
+ (χ → ψ) iff Pα |=
− χ or Pα |=
+ ψ and
also Pα |=
− (χ→ ψ) iff Pα |=
+ χ and Pα |=
− ψ. It is not entirely unnatural
to define some kind of a diamond (i.e., ⋄ϕ) by the formula ¬(ϕ→ ⊥). Here
⊥ is p ∧ ¬p.
3.3.3 First-order modal logic and beyond, a new take
We then consider first-order modal logic and beyond. The approach is very
similar to the one for propositional modal logic above, but we spell it out
anyway, because we can.
Let M be a model set, i.e., a set of pairs (M, f) where f is some assign-
ment for M, interpreting first-order variables. Let (Pα)α∈Z+ be a sequence
such that
1. P1 ⊆M.
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2. Pα+1 ⊆ P(Pα), where P is again the power set operator.
We call Pα a perspective of rank α. Again it often makes sense to not allow
the empty set to belong to or be a perspective. Also, it is relatively natural
to require the domain of all the models in the model set M to be the same.
A perspective Pα is called regular if it is built from a model set where all
models have the same domain. It is strongly regular if we also have Pα′ 6= ∅
for all perspectives Pα′ that are part of Pα on the different rank levels of
Pα (with the perspective Pα itself also nonempty). Below we study strongly
regular perspectives only.
Consider the language of first-order modal logic,
ϕ ::= Rx1 . . . xk | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | (ϕ ∨ ϕ) | ¬ϕ | ∃xϕ | ♦ϕ
where Rx1 . . . xk is any atom.
Define the rank r(ϕ) of a formula ϕ as follows.
1. r(χ) = 0 for each atomic formula χ.
2. r(¬χ) = r(χ).
3. r(χ ∧ ψ) = max{r(χ), r(ψ)}.
4. r(χ ∨ ψ) = max{r(χ), r(ψ)}.
5. r(∃xϕ) = r(ϕ).
6. r(♦ϕ) = r(ϕ) + 1.
A perspective Pα of rank α can interpret formulae of depth α or less with
the following semantics.
Assume first that r(ϕ) < α. Then
Pα |= ϕ iff Pα−1 |= ϕ for all Pα−1 ∈ Pα
Note that if α = 1, then Pα−1 is a model (M, f) in Pα. Then the above holds
with the natural additional definition that (M, f) |= ϕ iff (M, f) |=FO ϕ
where |=FO is the standard semantic turnstile of FO.
Now, we define (Pα ↾ χ) analogously to the definition given in Section
3.3.2. (In fact, the definition there can as it stands be read as a definition
for model sets in predicate logic as well as propositional modal logic.)
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Assume then that r(♦ϕ) = r(ψ) = α and r(χ) < α. Then
Pα |=
+ (χ ∧ ψ) iff Pα |=
+ χ and Pα |=
+ ψ
Pα |=
+ (ψ ∧ χ) iff Pα |=
+ ψ and Pα |=
+ χ
Pα |=
+ (χ ∨ ψ) iff
(
(Pα ↾ χ) |=
+ ψ or (Pα ↾ χ) = ∅
)
Pα |=
+ (ψ ∨ χ) iff
(
(Pα ↾ χ) |=
+ ψ or (Pα ↾ χ) = ∅
)
Pα |=
+ ¬ψ iff Pα |=
− ψ
Pα |=
+ ♦ϕ iff Pα−1 |=
+ ϕ for some Pα−1 ∈ Pα
Pα |=
− (χ ∧ ψ) iff Pα |=
− χ or Pα |=
− ψ
Pα |=
− (ψ ∧ χ) iff Pα |=
− ψ or Pα |=
− χ
Pα |=
− (χ ∨ ψ) iff
(
(Pα ↾ χ) |=
− ψ and (Pα ↾ χ) 6= ∅
)
Pα |=
− (ψ ∨ χ) iff
(
(Pα ↾ χ) |=
− ψ and (Pα ↾ χ) 6= ∅
)
Pα |=
− ¬ψ iff Pα |=
+ ψ
Pα |=
− ♦ϕ iff Pα−1 |=
− ϕ for all Pα−1 ∈ Pα
Assume then that r(χ) = r(ψ) = α. Then
Pα |=
+ (χ ∧ ψ) iff Pα |=
+ χ and Pα |=
+ ψ
Pα |=
− (χ ∧ ψ) iff Pα |=
− χ or Pα |=
− ψ
Pα |=
+ (χ ∨ ψ) iff Pα |=
+ χ or Pα |=
+ ψ
Pα |=
− (χ ∨ ψ) iff Pα |=
− χ and Pα |=
− ψ
If P is a perspective, we let P [a/x] denote the perspective where each
model (M, f) existing on the rank 0 level of P is replaced by (M, f [a/x]). By
the model domain of P we refer to the domain of the models the (regular)
perpective P is built with. Assume ∃xϕ and P have the same rank. We
define
P |=+ ∃xϕ iff P [a/x] |=+ ϕ for some a in the model domain of P .
and
P |=− ∃xϕ iff P [a/x] |=− ϕ for all a in the model domain of P .
The implication can of course be added to the picture with the same
semantics as given above for propositional modal logic.
Now consider the more general language
ϕ ::= Rx1 . . . xk | (ϕ ∨ ϕ) | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | ¬ϕ | Qxϕ | 〈Q〉ϕ
where each Q belongs to some symbol set Q. Both Qx and 〈Q〉 will be
associated with generalized quantifiers, so the language corresponding to Q
will contain a generalized quantifier22 Qx and a generalized modality 〈Q〉
for each symbol Q ∈ Q. The rank of a formula is measured in terms of the
possibly different operators 〈Q〉, each application adding to the rank.
22Or a minor quantifier [13], to be exact.
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Recall here the definition of a unary generalized quantifier (see [13] for the
(standard) definition we shall use). Let U be a unary generalized quantifier.
We let U denote {(A,S) | (A,S) 6∈ U }.
Let U be a unary generalized quantifier. Consider a class C of structures
(A,B+, B−) such that the following conditions hold.
1. A 6= ∅
2. B+, B− ⊆ A
3. B+ ∩B− = ∅
4. C is closed under isomorphism, that is, if f : A→ A′ is an isomorphism
from (A,B+, B−) ∈ C to (A,C+, C−) then (A,C+, C−) ∈ C.
5. For each (A,B+, B−) ∈ C, there is a pair (A,H) ∈ U such that B+ ⊆
H and B− ⊆ A \H.
6. For each (A,B+, B−) ∈ C, there does not exists a pair (A,H) ∈ U
such that B+ ⊆ H and B− ⊆ A \H.
7. For each (A,H) ∈ U , there exists a pair (A,B+, B−) ∈ C such that
B+ ⊆ H and B− ⊆ A \H.
Then we say that C witnesses U . A minor quantifier based on U is a pair
Q = (C,D) such that C witnesses U and D witnesses U . We denote C by Q+
and D by Q−.
We fix the lastly defined semantics for modal predicate logic given above
(in this Section), with only the clauses for Qx and 〈Q〉 redifined. Recall that
the semantics for predicate logic with quantifiers Qx on ordinary first-order
models is defined, e.g., in [13].
Suppose 〈Q〉ϕ and P have the same rank. We define that
Pα |=
+ 〈Q〉ϕ iff (Pα, P
+, P−) ∈ Q+
where P+ ⊆ Pα is some set of perspectives Pα−1 ∈ Pα such that Pα−1 |=
+ ϕ
and P− ⊆ Pα is some set of perspectives Qα−1 ∈ Pα such that Qα−1 |=
− ϕ.
Similarly,
Pα |=
− 〈Q〉ϕ iff (Pα, P
+, P−) ∈ Q−
where again P+ ⊆ Pα is some set of perspectives Pα−1 ∈ Pα such that
Pα−1 |=
+ ϕ and P− ⊆ Pα some set of perspectives Qα−1 ∈ Pα such that
Qα−1 |=
− ϕ.
Now let M denote the model domain of P . We define
P |=+ Qxϕ iff for some (M,S, T ) ∈ Q+, we have
P [a/x] |=+ ϕ for all a ∈ S and
P [a/x] |=− ϕ for all a ∈ T.
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Also,
P |=− Qxϕ iff for some (M,S, T ) ∈ Q−, we have
P [a/x] |=+ ϕ for all a ∈ S and
P [a/x] |=− ϕ for all a ∈ T.
It is easy to see how to generalize all this to formulae with more general
generalized (minor) quantifiers. For example, 〈Q〉(ϕ,ψ) with Q indicating
that more elements of the perspective satisfy ϕ than ψ, is interesting.
3.4 More on perspectives
It is natural to define an implication equivalent to (¬ϕ ∨ ψ), where  is
¬♦¬. Also, it is possible to consider the approach P |= ϕ ⇒ ψ iff P ′ |= ψ,
where P ′ ⊆ P contains those Q ∈ P such that Q |= ϕ. Note that ⇒ will not
alter the rank but the implication with (¬ϕ ∨ ψ) will.
It is also very natural to go multimodal. This is easy by replacing per-
spectives by pairs with a perspective and a label. The label denotes the
agent (or whatever). The perspective itself can contain sets with different
labels, but the notion of rank of course has to be adjusted. It is not diffi-
cult to model these approaches in Kripke semantics (by creating sets, i.e.,
perspectives, with the help of ).
Suppose x has some value in N. Consider the following reasoning sce-
nario. If x is even, then it is not possible that x is odd. Thus, if x is even,
it is not the case that it is possible that x is odd and it is possible that x is
even. Writing this in symbols (without any particular semantics fixed), we
get “x is even→ ¬(♦(x is odd)∧♦(x is even))”. We symmetrically conclude
that “x is odd → ¬(♦(x is odd) ∧ ♦(x is even))”. Let us abbreviate these
statements by ϕeven → ¬χ and ϕodd → ¬χ. Now, supposing we can deduce
C from A ∨ B, A → C, B → C, we deduce ¬χ from ϕeven ∨ ϕodd. That
is, we deduce ¬(♦(x is odd)∧♦(x is even)) because surely x is even or odd.
However, it is clear that (♦(x is odd) ∧ ♦(x is even)) holds.
One way to reject the faulty reasoning is to assert that epistemic and
metaphysical modalities are mixed up. Indeed, we can reject “x is even →
¬(♦(x is odd))” if we read ♦ as “it appears to be possible that.” But if we
only wish to consider possible scenarios without there being an actual world
(which would be unknown but would give x some value), we can reject the
deduction rule “C from A ∨ B, A → C, B → C,” as the above ssemantics
does if → is given the interpretation of ⇒ we defined above. This is because
A ∨ B does not mean that A is surely true or B is surely true, simply that
the space of scenarios splits so that A is the case in the first and B in the
second scenario.
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